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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Unfortunately, Appellant in the second paragraph of her 
Statement of the Case and throughout her brief raises issues 
foreclosed ln this appeal by the Supreme Court's Order entered 
November 2, 2011 granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
Appellant's Issues 3(d) and 3(e) of her Notice of Appeal 1 • Susan 
abandoned her appeal from the denial of her Motion for 
Clarification. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. Nor does the Record 
support Susan's allegation on page 5 of Appellant's Brief that 
"Susan has been deprived of approximately $460,000 of community 
assets, while affording a windfall to Michael in the same 
amount". That allegation is not an issue in this appeal. 
Appellant's current counsel is Susan's third attorney and she did 
not try the case. R., p. 37. Susan also states that she filed a 
timely appeal to the District Court, but the District Court ruled 
otherwise. R. p. 1240. Because of other misstatements of fact and 
omissions, out of caution, it is necessary to restate the 
pertinent facts and history. 
ssue 3 (d) read, "Whether the tfJagistrate erred in the Amended Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce by including speculative tax consequences in its business 
valuation". Issue 3(e) read, "Whether the Magistrate erred in the Order Re: Post Trial 
Motions by failing to adjust the equali ation payment according to the actual tax 
consequences". R. p. 1 5'7. 
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Susan Vierstra filed a Complaint for Divorce on September 
19, 2008, at a time when the dairy had already begun a sharp 
decline because of market conditions. Tr. Vol. III of III, p. 
194, 205 (November 20, 2009); Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 30 32 (October 
13, 2009) Mike and Susan married on July 31, 1988, when Mike 
was in the dairy business with his father. Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 
5, (November 19, 2009). Vierstra Dairy started in 1992 and was a 
sale proprietorship owned by the parties. Tr. Vol. III of III, p. 
191, (November 20, 2009). Susan was not active in the dairy 
since 2005. Tr. Vol. III of III, p. 191. 
Trial over 5 days before Magistrate, Howard D. Smyser, 
commenced on October 13 th and ended on November 24th, 2009. 
Seventy-three (73) exhibits were introduced and thirteen (13) 
witnesses testified and after thorough post trial briefing the 
court took the matter under advisement on December 7, 2009 and 
issued its Memorandum Decision on January 7, 2010. R. p. 545. The 
Judgment and Decree of Djvorce followed on January 25, 2010, 
which started Susan's time for appeal. R. p. 597. 
The Trial Court awarded Susan the first option right to 
purchase the dairy at a value determined by Mike's witness, 
Buckner Harris, C.P.A., who was more credible, and that value 
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consisted of dairy land, the Blass crop farm, feed lot, rolling 
stock and the other assets and debts of Vierstra Dairy. 
Memorandum Decision, R., p. 557 and 562.2 Susan filed on January 
20, 2010, her Notice of Intent to Exercise her first option. R., 
p. 588. Susan could not obtain financing within sixty days of the 
January 7, 2010 Memorandum Decision, which then triggered Mike's 
option to buy the dairy. Mike timely filed on March 9, 2010, his 
Notice of Intent to Exercise his option to purchase the dairy. 
R., p. 864. 3 
On February 8, 2010, Susan filed on the fourteenth day, an 
Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree and her prior 
trial attorney attempted to re-draft the Judgment and Decree 
previously entered by the Court on January 25, 2011. R., p. 630. 
The next day, February 9, 2010, Susan filed an untimely (by one 
day) Motion for Reconsideration on issues not germane to this 
appeal. R., p. 649. On March 25, 2010, Susan finally lodged a 
2 The Magistrate found, based on the evidence that the more credible evidence 
favored adopting Mike's witness, David McKinley's appraisal and Buckner Harris 
C.P.A.'s bus ness valuation of Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 562, Memorandum Decision. The 
court did not accept Susan's expert real taLe appraiser, Joe Dunlap's value, or 
C.P.A. Todd Wadsworth's business valua ion of Vierstra Dairy. R., p. . Mr. Sf 
value of Vierstra Dairy was $1,058,53 , whereas Mr. Wadswo th found a value of 
$4,887,767. R., p. 557, Memorandum Decision. 
3 Mike was able to obtain a loan from Citizens Bank and remove Susan's liability 
from Dairy debt and pay he $3 8,896.63 from the loan to equa i e the community 
estate. rz. p. 1003. Susan accepted that sum, bringing net es te to 
$1,212,306.63, but she is appealing, seeking $460,482 more. rz. p. 912. 
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supporting Memorandum in support of her Objection to the Form of 
the Judgment and Decree. R., p. 889. The Amended Judgment 
entered on April 29, 2010, altered the paragraphs in Exhibit 630 
attached to the original Judgment regarding child support and 
health insurance 4 which were not issues on appeal to the District 
Court or the Supreme Court. R., p. 988-989. Magistrate Smyser on 
April 27, 2010, after a hearing in open court, ruled that it 
could not find anything that was inaccurate in the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p. 19. Judge 
Smyser stated that the Decree mirrors what he said in his opinion 
and the criticism of Susan's counsel was a matter of semantics. 
Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p. 19. The Amended Judgment entered 
on April 29, 2010, contained the same language as appeared in the 
original Judgment regarding the tax liability associated with 
Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 1240. 
~The court finds the tax consequence to be 
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as is 
shown on Exhibit 801(a). The Court finds 
that it is more likely than not that Vierstra 
1 The changes were to the custody schedule and parenting plan, Exhibit 630, 
attached to the Decree, and deleted paragraph 0 regarding child support which was 
inaccurate as it conflicted with the proper wording of child support in paragraphs 4 
and 5 in the body of the Judgment which remained the same. The health insurance clause 
for the children was deleted in Exhibit 630 in paragraph 11, as it a so was covered in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Judgment and Decree which did not change. The Amended 
Judgment removed said paragraphs from Exhibit 630 regarding child support and health 
insurance attached to the Decree. E., p. 988-989. ThE, Amendment corrected clerical 
mistakes. R., p. 1141. 
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Dairy will incur the tax consequence ... If no 
tax consequence occurs, or if the tax 
consequence is different from that shown in 
Exhibit 801(a), the parties shall adjust the 
valuations and equalizations accordingly. If 
necessary, the parties can petition the court 
to address the adjustments." 
The District Court ruled that since the Amended Judgment 
contained the same language and determination that is set forth 
in the original Judgment regarding the tax liability, that the 
time for appeal on that issue began to run on the date of the 
original Judgment. R., p. 1240. 
After Susan could not consummate her first option to buy the 
dairy, Susan filed on April 23, 2010, a "Motion to Petition the 
Court to Address Adjustments", seeking an adjustment to Judge 
Smyser's valuation of Vierstra Dairy based on the amount of the 
parties' 2009 income taxes. R., p. 921. Susan's Motion was 
another attempt to convince the trial court to reconsider its 
decision of the value of the dairy after considering the tax and 
unless the trial court increased the equalization payment to her, 
then she wanted Judge Smyser to order the dairy sold. Tr. Vol. II 
of II, p. 151, May 12, 2010. The Magistrate conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on May 12, 2010, and denied Susan's Motion to 
adjust the equalization payment for taxes, and memorialized the 
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same In the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, May 18, 2010, R., p. 
1003. If the Dairy were sold Susan would receive less than if 
Mike bought her out pursuant to the sum of $378,896 set by the 
court in its Order entered on May 18, 2010, entitled "Order Re: 
Post Trial Motions". R., p. 1003. Susan had lived with the 
court's decision until such time as she could not qualify to buy 
the dairy, which prompted her Motion to Petition the Court to 
Address Adjustments, wherein she urged yet again C.P.A. 
Wadsworth's view of the tax amount. R., p. 588. Susan created an 
untenable situation for Mike who was in the process of renewing 
his operating loans and obtaining a new loan from Citizens Bank 
to cash out Susan. Susan was threatening to obstruct the closing 
and may not sign the deeds on the land securing the Citizen's 
loan or remove her father's improper deed of trust on the land). 
In addition, Susan demanded by way of an Affidavit filed April 
23, 2010, an additional $460,482 at the closing. R., p. 912. That 
obstruction prompted Mike's request for a hearing on May J2, 
2010. R, p. 927-931, Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p.9-10.c 
To obtain a release of her father's deed of trust Susan improperly demanded o[ 
Mike an additional $130,000. R., p. 880 and R., p. 929. Susan's obstruction the 
closing prompted Mike's Motion [or Emergency Ex Parte Relief. R. p. 880. 
6 Mike made the Magistrate aware that Susan's tactic would prevenL Lhe closing. 
There were also further adjustments to reduce the original amoun due Susan that had 
to be heard prior to the closing and Judge Smyser did not want to put off the hearing, 
which was set for May 2, 2010. Tr., p. 21, L. 6-7, April ?7, ?010. F. p. lOllI, 'JIl 3. 
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Susan's Motion to Petition the Court to Address Adjustments 
prompted Mike to respond by Affidavit and request a hearing so 
that the loan could close. R., p. 927. 
Susan filed her Notice of Appeal on June 10, 2010. The 
Notice of Appeal gave notice that Susan appealed from the Amended 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce and the Order Re: Post Trial 
Motions. The sole issue on appeal to the District Court was the 
Magistrate's determination that was set forth in the original 
Judgment regarding the tax liability in Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 
1240. The case on appeal was assigned to experienced District 
Judge Michael R. Crabtree, acting as an intermediate appellate 
court pursuant to Rule 83(a), I.R.C.P., and the District Court 
sua sponte raised the issue that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal and directed supplemental briefing on 
February 4, 2011. R. p. 1138. Once final briefs were lodged, the 
District Court issued its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal on June 9, 
2011, dismissing Susan's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R., p. 
1236, 1244. Susan asked the District Court to reconsider in her 
"Motion for Clarification" and the matter was heard on July 11, 
2011. The District Court entered its Order denying the Motion 
for Clarification on July 13, 2011, and restated its ruling that 
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(1) it lacked the jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the 
Amended Judgment in this case, dated April 29, 2010, and (2) that 
the Magistrate lacked the jurisdiction to conduct the post-trial 
hearing and to enter paragraph 4 of the Order Re: Post Trial 
Motions dated May 18, 2010, regarding the tax liability and 
valuation of Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 1253. Accordingly, the Appeal 
was dismissed and the case was not remanded for further 
proceedings because no further action was required by the 
Magistrate in that regard. R., p. 1253, Order Den ng Motion for 
Clarification! . 
Susan alleges in her brief that instead of enforcing its 
previous Judgments and automatically adjusting the value of 
Vierstra Dairy, the Magistrate reopened the issue and received 
additional testimony on the subject on May 12, 2010, and then 
held that some tax would corne due over the next several years, 
although it was without proof of the $1,006,000 tax liability 
amount. Appellant's Brief, p. 6. Susan alleges that the effect 
, The Uistrict Court found that Appellant did not cite to any atute, rule or 
case law permitting a "motion for clarification" after a cas has been decided on 
appeal. The District Court ruled that aft an appeal decided, a Uis riet Court, 
in its appellate capacity, may consider a timely petition for rehearing. .R.C.P., 
83(x), .A.R. 42. Further the District Court held that a "Motion for Reconsideration" 
after an appeal s decided may be treated as a Petition for Rehearing under the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, citing Di.eziger v. P.ickering, 122 Idaho 78,838 P.2d 321 (Idaho App. 
1992), however, there is no appellate rul that appears to permit a motion for 
clarification after an appeal is decided. R., p. 1254. 
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of this Order was to reverse and modify the Magistrate's previous 
finding requiring what she labeled as a so-called "automatic 
adjustment". Appellant's Brief, p. 7. The foregoing statements 
were inaccurate. First and foremost, the Magistrate did not 
change the decision at all and the $1,006,000 tax amount remained 
the same. Second, the court denied Susan's Motion. R., p. 1003. 8 
The following statements of fact by Susan are irrelevant for 
purposes of this Appeal: 
A. "In 1987 before the parties' marriage Michael 
declared bankruptcy". Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
B. "At the time of their marriage she invested her 
separate funds and Susan's father also helped the 
couple finance and expand the dairy." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 9. Susan did not prove the loan from the 
father nor trace her separate property at trial. 
Her father did not testify. 
IV. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
Respondent requests his attorneys fees if he prevails as a 
prevailing party pursuant to Rule S4 (e) (1), I.R.C.P., Rule 41, 
I.A.R., and r . ~. § 12 121. The Appellant brought the appeal 
, Judge Smyser also directed Susan to record the release of her father's deed of 
trust (which she held until the very las minute) so that the loan would fund and 
close. R., p. 1004. 
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unreasonably or without foundation, in that the District Court, 
and now the Supreme Court, lacked jurisdiction. 
The Appellant fails to present any significant lssue on 
appeal regarding a question of law, and the Supreme Court has not 
been asked to establish any new legal standards or modify 
existing ones. The focus of the case is on the application of 
settled law to the issue of failure to timely appeal the 
Judgment. The attempt in this appeal is to return and litigate 
again the issue of the tax liability previously decided by the 
Magistrate Court, which is res judicata. Accordingly, the appeal 
should be deemed unreasonable and Respondent should be awarded 
his attorneys fees incurred on this appeal. Huerta v. Huerta, 
127 Idaho 77, 896 P.2d 985 (Idaho App. 




1995); Reed v. Reed, 137 
On appeal of a decision rendered by a District Court, acting 
in its appellate capacity, the Supreme will directly review the 
District Court's decision to determine whether it correctly 
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decided the issues presented to it on appeal. Borley v. Smith, 
149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 (2010); Idaho Dept. of Health and 
Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009). 
Given the course correction in Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008), referred to as such in the case 
of In Re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008), rather 
than reviewing the Magistrate Court's decision independently of, 
but with due regard for the District Court's decision, the 
Supreme Court now directly reviews the District Court's decision. 
Thus, the Supreme Court considers whether the District Court 
committed error. In Re Daniel W., p. 679. 9 
The interpretation of an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure is a 
question of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free 
review. Dawson v. Cheyovich Fami Trust r 149 Idaho 375, 234 p.3d 
699 (2010); also see by analogy: In Re Daniel W., supra, applying 
the same standard of free review to a Statute. 
The Supreme Court will review freely conclusions of law 
reached, by stating legal ru es or principles and applying them 
9 Given the "course correetion U , it would seem logica that the Supreme Court 
would still give "due regard to the Dist iet Court's analysis U of a rule of law and 
the application of jurisdictional facts as found by the District Court. See: Roe 
Family Services v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, BB P.3d 749 (2004); McNelis v. McNelis, 119 
Idaho 349,806 P.2d 442 ( 99 ); Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904,'181 P.2d 241 
(Ct. App. 1989). This is in keeping with the siqnificant purpose of the District 
Court's role as an intermediate appellate court. Rule 83(b), I.R.C.P. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 11 
to facts found. Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52 
(Ct. App. 1990). If the law has been properly applied to the 
facts as found, the Judgment will be upheld on appeal. See 
Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 963 P.2d 1168 (1998). 
In that regard the Supreme Court reviews questions of law freely. 
Matter of Estate of Wagner, 126 Idaho 848, 893 P.2d 211 (1995). 
The Appellate Court may raise a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction sua sponte at any time. T.J.T., Inc. v. Mori, 148 
Idaho 825, 230 P.3d 435 (2010); also see State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552 (Ct. App. 2010); and In Re: Quesnell 
Dairy, 143 Idaho 691, 693, 152 p.3d 562, 564 (2007). The timely 
filing of a Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional. In Re Universal 
Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 755, 171 P.3d 242, 246 (2007). 
Jurisdictional issues are questions of law over which this court 
exercises free review. T.J.T., Inc., v. Mori, supra, p. 827 
(citing Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473, 475 
(2009)). An appellate court cannot address the merits of an 
appeal that is determined to be untimely. Walton, Inc. v. 
Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999). 
While Susan discusses that the standard of review concerning 
the disposition of community property is reviewed under the abuse 
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of discretion standard (Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 
P.3d 140 (2001), the award of the dairy and value are not issues 
in this appeal. While the substantial evidence test may apply to 
the facts found, it is not the evidence found by the Magistrate 
that is involved in this appeal either. Susan consistently 
ignores throughout her brief that the validity of the 
Magistrate's finding of the value of Vierstra Dairy and the tax 
consequence is not an issue in this appeal. Order Granting 
Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Issues 3D and 3E, entered by the 
Supreme Court on November 2, 2011. 
The Property Division portions of the Decree of Divorce are 
"final, res judicata and no jurisdiction exists to modify 
property provisions of a Decree of Divorce". McBride v. McBride, 
112 Idaho 959, 739 P.2d 258(1987); Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 115 
Idaho 692, 769 P.2d 569 (1989), cited by Appellant. 
B. 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED 
JANUARY 25, 2010 WAS THE FINAL JUDGMENT FROM 
WHICH SUSAN SHOULD HAVE APPEALED AND HER 
FAILURE TO TIMELY APPEAL DIVESTED THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF JURISDICTION. 
Susan's first argument on appeal is that the District Court 
should not have dismissed her appeal from the Order Re: Post 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 13 
Trial Motions entered by the Magistrate on May 18, 2010. 10 
However, this is the tail end of the jurisdiction question that 
first must begin with Susan's untimely appeal from the Judgment 
and Decree entered January 25, 2010. R., p. 597. So as not to 
produce so much unnecessary banter, Susan should have addressed 
her argument in Part C (1) (2) of her Brief first, since the 
repeated attempt to attack the tax ruling fails for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered January 25, 2010, 
memorialized the Memorandum Decision issued January 7, 2010 and 
was the Final Judgment. I.R.C.P. Rule 54 (a) states "A judgment is 
final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to 
subsection (b) (1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on 
all claims for relief, except costs and fees". In Harney v. 
Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 781 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals found the District Court's approach was flawed 
when it held that the Magistrate's written decision did not 
qualify as a judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a) because the 
10 Appellant comrnences her argumenL that the Dist ct CourL has u isdiction by 
returning to the Finding of Fac recited in Lhe Judgment which fixed the value of 
Vierstra Dairy after consideration at Lax. Memorandum Decis ,R. p. ~63, Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce; n., p. 602, J\mended ,Judgment and Decree of Divorce, R., p. 962. 
That initial finding did not change in the Amended Judgment or in the Order [-(e: Post 
Trial Motions entered May 18, 2010, paragraph 4, R. p. 1003. 
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decision was not a final judgment. The Court of Appeals 
explained that there was no basis that the Magistrate's decision 
was not a final judgment, under I.R.C.P. 83(a) (1) because there 
were no "other issues that remained to be liti ed". Harney, 
supra at p. 907-908. Following the Harney analysis and the plain 
language of I.R.C.P. 54(a), the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered January 25, 2010 was the final judgment since the 
judgment was entered as to "all claims for relief" and there 
were no "other issues" that remained to be litiga ed. 
In this case, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce resolved 
all claims for relief, including the division and valuation of 
community property, the tax consequences in Vierstra dairy, 
confirmation of separate property, child custody and child 
support. Susan's argument that the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was not final is belied by her actions. Susan did not dispute the 
finality of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce; rather she relied 
upon the same and accepted the Magistrate's valuation of Vierstra 
Dairy at Mr. Harris' lower value rather than what her accountant 
Mr. Wadsworth concluded, as evidenced by her Intent to Exercise 
Option to purchase the dairy at that value. R., p. 588. 
Additionally, Susan's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
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The disposition of the Vierstra Dairy tax liability issue 
was not appealable separate from the disposition of that issue in 
the original Judgment. R., p. 1240. This is so because the 
Amended Judgment did not change in any way that particular 
disposition in the original Judgment and the time for appeal of 
that disposition issue began on the date of the original 
Judgment. State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 
(Ct. App. 1996) Also see, State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 246 
P.3d 958 (2010) The foregoing ruling by the District Court was 
correct and there is no error to be found in applying the law. 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 
P.3d 448; In Re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008) 
As can be seen from Mike's Statement of the Case at p. 4, the 
only aspect of the Amended Judgment that differed from the 
original Judgment were clerical deletions from Exhibit 630 that 
inadvertently conflicted with the body of the Judgment regarding 
child support and health insurance for the children, but in no 
way were those issues connected with the disposition and va ue of 
Vierstra Dairy.: 
" By deleting clerica mistakes in Exhibit 630 the child suppo amount and 
health insurance responsibility remained exactly as was stated in the body of the 
,Judgment. 
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Since Susan's objection did not suspend the time for appeal 
from the original Judgment and the Amended Judgment is not 
separately appealable on the tax liability issue, Susan's appeal 
is untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. R., 
p. 1240. 
C. 
SUSAN'S OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT SUSPEND OR TOLL 
THE TIME PERIOD FOR FILING HER APPEAL OF THE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE UNDER I.R.C.P. 83(e) or 
I.A.R. 14. 
I.R.C.P. 83(e) provides: 
"The time for appe from a final judgment is suspended 
by ... (2) a timely motion to amend or make additional 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, whether or not 
alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is 
granted, (3) a timely motion to alter or amend the 
judgment (except motions under Rule 60 or motions 
regarding costs and attorney fees); ... and the fulJ time 
for appeal from such a final judgment commences to run 
and is to be computed from the date of the clerk's filing 
stamp on any order granting or denying any of the above 
motions. 
I.A.R. 14(a) similarly provides: 
" ... The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or 
order in an action is terminated by the filing of a 
timely motion which, if granted, could affect any 
findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in 
the action (exc motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure or motions regarding costs or 
attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period for all 
judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the 
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clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such 
motion ... " 
The civil motions set forth in Rule 83(e), I.R.C.P. and I.A.R. 
14 (a) which suspend or terminate the time for appeal include 
timely motions under I.R. C. P. 59(e), timely motions for 
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11(a) (2) (B), timely motions under 
I.R.C.P 52 (b) to amend findings or conclusions or make additional 
findings and conclusions, or a timely motion for new trial under 
I. R. C. P. 59 (b). Each of the motions above requires that they be 
filed no later than 14 days after entry of the final jUdgment. See 
I.R.C.P 11(a) (2) (B), I.R.C.P 52(b), I.R.C.P. 59(b), I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 67 P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Plaintiff's Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce was not a motion contemplated under I.R.C.P. 83 (e) or 
I.A.R. 14 (a). The Objection did not reference a rule or statute 
under which it was made. The objection was not filed pursuant to 
any explicitly stated Rule of Procedure. R., p. 1238. The time for 
filing appea , as provided in I.A.R. 14 (a) is terminated only by 
motions cognizable under Civil or Criminal rules of procedure. 
State v. Nelson, 104 Idaho 430, 659 P.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Nowhere in Susan's "Objection" or Memorandum n Support is the word 
"Motion" mentioned. R., p. 630, R., p. 889. 
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In Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 
1992), the Court of Appeals listed the various avenues for directly 
attacking a divorce decree. "Once a divorce decree becomes final, 
it is res judicata with respect to all issues which were or could 
have been litigated." See Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 333, 
612 P.2d 1175, 1180 (1980). "However, there exist various avenues 
for directly attacking a divorce decree. For example, a party may 
move the district court to amend the decree, or for a new trial, 
within fourteen days of the decree's entry. See I.R.C.P. 59(d) and 
59(e). The decree is also subject to appeal within forty-two days. 
I.C. § 13-201; I.A.R. 14(a)." Harper v. Harper, supra, at pp. 536-
537. 
Susan's objection was not a cognizable motion pursuant to 
I.A.R 14(a) or I.R.C.P. 83(e) . Susan's Objection, even if 
considered a "Motion" did not seek to affect any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law. From the period January 20, 2010 through 
March 18, 2010, Susan sought to obtain a loan commi tmen t to 
purchase Vierstra dairy in accordance with the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce. It was not unti she failed in that regard, that Susan 
finally filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to 
the Form of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce on March 25, 2010. 
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R., p. 889. It would be expected then at that point, she would seek 
to amend or alter the magistrate's findings or facts or conclusions 
of law with respect to the value of Vierstra dairy. However, her 
Obj ection did not seek that the court alter the valuation of 
Vierstra Dairy or make amended findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The reason is that on February 8, 2010, Susan wanted to buy 
the dairy at Mr. Harris' value which the court adopted, not the 
much higher value of her expert witness, Todd Wadsworth. R., p. 
588. Her Objection only sought to make clerical corrections to the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
The District Court was obviously accurate in concluding that 
corrections she sought to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce were 
merely clerical. Nowhere in the Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce does Susan contest or request changes to the findings of 
fact or conclusion of law of the Magistrate. Susan's objection to 
the final judgment sought to substitute her lawyer's draft of the 
Judgment and to 
• strike "various statements of facts that for some 
reason Defendant determined were important to include 
in the final order" 
• strike "duplicated" separate orders 
• strike "unnecessary and redundant statements regarding 
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion that was dismissed" 
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• "quash the January 25, 2010 Judgment and decree and 
replace it with Plaintiff's proposed Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce". R., p. 890. 
Susan's Objection to only the "form" of the Judgment and not the 
findings of fact or conclusions d not suspend the time for 
appeal. 
Even giving Susan the benefit of doubt that her obj ection 
could be viewed as a "Motion", it was then as the District court 
concluded that an I.R.C.P 60(a) motion to correct clerical mistakes 
does not toll the time for appeal. I.R.C.P. 83(e), I.A.R. 14(a). 
The District Court correctly pointed out in its Order for 
Supplemental Briefing that "the record does not reveal that any 
motions were filed which would suspend the time for appeal ... " 
(Order for Supplemental Briefing, R., p. 1141) and so concluded in 
its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, R., p. 1240. 
Susan asserts that her Objection and Memorandum in Support, 
"clearly" implicates the provisions of I.A.R. 14(a). Susan 
incorrectly tells the court in her Brief that "the lengthy list of 
obj ections to various facts contained in the Judgment, together 
with the objections to the form of the Judgment and request to 
quash the Judgment and replace it in its entirety, if granted would 
have affected any findings of fact, conclusions of Law or any 
judgment in the action." There was no mention in the Brief of what 
"finding of fact" or "conclusion of law" she is talking about. Her 
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request to replace the judgment with her own was not a Motion 
recognized under I.R.C.P. 52 (b) F I.R.C.P. 59(b)F or I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
The at tempt to replace such a judgment with her own version, 
without altering or amending the findings of fact or conclusions of 
law, was not sufficient to "affect any judgment in the matter". 
Rule 83(e), I.R.C.P. State v. Payan, supra; Rule 14 (a), I .A.R.; 
Walton Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The purpose behind I.A.R. 14(a) is not to allow a person to object 
to excessive page length of the Judgment, as Susan did, and have 
such request, suspend the time for appeal on the findings of fact 
and conclusion of law, to which she did not object. Objections to 
semantics, the type of font, size of letters, or failure to 
capitalize a word could not extend the time for appeal. 
Susan relies on Walton F Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 
P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999) to support an argument that her objection 
to the Judgment terminated the time for filing appeal. Susan's 
reliance on Walton is misplaced as the objections in Walton are 
distinguishable from the Obj ection Susan filed in this case. In 
Wal ton, the Court determined that Wal ton breached his contract with 
Jensen and required him to pay damages. Both Walton and Jensen 
filed objections to the District Court's factual determination of 
damages. Those objections were to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the District Court, not to the form of the 
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judgment. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Walton acknowledged that 
"both parties filed motions objecting to portions of the judgment. 
These Motions did extend the time to file appeal ... because they 
could have affect [ed] ... findings of fact, conclusions of 
law ... [and the] judgment in the action. Id at p. 719. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals concluded that after the order denying the 
"motions" objecting to the damages, no further motions were pending 
that could affect the damage award and that the appeal period ran 
from that time. Significantly in Wal ton appears the statement 
"Under I.A.R. 14 the parties' forty-two days to file an appeal 
began running when the district court issued its order on November 
4 because that order was a final judgment which resolved all 
moti_ons contesting the district court's findings of fact and 
conclusion of law." Id. at 719. (emphasis added). Susan's reliance 
on Walton to support her position that her objection started the 
time for appeal anew, ignores the fact her obj ection did not 
contest the Magistrate's "finding of fact and conclusion of law." 
Walton at 719. In this case, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was the final order and no timely motion was filed contesting the 
findings of fact and conclusion of law and thus time for appeal was 
not tolled or started anew. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 24 
Susan attempts to support her position that the time period 
for appeal was terminated with the timely filing of an "objection" 
by citing five cases, none which state that an "objection" starts 
anew the period of the time for appeal. First, Susan cited Floyd v. 
Board of Com'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 723, 52 P.3d 
863 (2002) which dealt with a reconsideration motion. Next, Susan 
cited Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. v. Burtenshaw, 122 Idaho 
904, 907, 841 P.2d 434 (1992), which dealt with a Motion for 
Reconsideration. Next, Susan cited Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 
690, 694, 838 P.2d 293(1992), but it dealt with an I.R.C.P. 59(e) 
motion to alter or amend. Susan cited Sinclair Marketing, Inc. v. 
Siepert, 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d 385 (1985), which dealt with the 
appeal period starting anew after the filing of any "timely post-
judgment motion." Id at 1006. The Sinclair holding was broad and 
provides little guidance. I.R.C.P. 83(e) and I.A.R. 14(a) do not 
state that "any timely post judgment motion" terminates the time 
for appeal, but only those that "affect the findings of fact and 
conclusion of law or any judgment." See I.R.C.P. 83(e) and I.A.R. 
14(a). Lastly, Susan cites CecLI v. Gagnebin, 146 Idaho 714, 202 
P.3d 1 (2009), in which the time for appeal was terminated from an 
award of attorney's fees and costs, by the filing of "a motion to 
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amend the amended judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure." Id at 5. Susan did not file a Rule 59(e) 
Motion in this case, rather she sought to delete a clerical error 
in Exhibit 630. In determining whether a Motion is a Rule 59(e) 
Motion, or a Rule 60 Motion, the substance of the Motion controls. 
Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 115, 878 P.2d 813, 814 n.1 (Ct. App. 
1994). Susan's Motion was not a Rule 59(e) Motion which sought to 
correct legal and factual errors occurring in the proceeding, i.e. 
the tax issue. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 
760 (2007). R., p. 1239. 
D. 
THE AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DID NOT CHANGE THE DISPOSITION OF THE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE; THE TIME FOR 
APPEAL RAN FROM THE DATE THE JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS ENTERED. 
In State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App 
1996), the Court of Appeals determined that the Di str ict Court's 
Amendment to the Judgment of Conviction did not suspend or start 
anew the time period for filing appeal. In Payan, a Judgment of 
Conviction was entered and Payan untimely filed a notice of appea 
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from said Judgment. 1.2 The District Court then entered an Amended 
Judgment of Conviction adding a provision giving Payan credit for 
time already served. Payan argued that when the District Court 
entered an Amended Judgment his notice of appeal became premature. 
The Court stated ~the amendment to the judgment only added credit 
for time served and did not otherwise change the terms of the 
original judgment ... therefore, although an alteration was made to 
the judgment of conviction, it is of no consequence for the 
purposes of this appeal and will therefore not be interpreted to 
toll the appeal period." Id at 867. The appellate rules do not 
specifically provide that when the trial court adds language to a 
judgment ... the addition commences the appeal period anew for all 
purposes . .. If the district court had issued an ~order" granting 
Payan credit for time served, that would not properly initiate a 
new appeal period for any of the unaffected terms in the original 
judgment. Id at 867. 
In applying the facts in Payan to this case, the Amended 
Judgment and Decree only added paragraph 17 changing Susan's name 
at her request and removed paragraphs 10 and 11 regarding child 
support and health insurance from Exhibit 630 attached thereto, 
" The logic in Payan, supra, applies equally to criminal or civil rules. 
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leaving intact the child support and health insurance language in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Decree, exactly as it was. Those changes 
were to correct clerical mistakes and were stipulated by the 
parties. Such deletions from Exhibit 630 did not start anew or 
suspend the time for appeal from the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, nor did the issuance of the Amended Judgment extend the 
time for appeal. Because the sole issue in the appeal to the 
District Court was the Magistrate's determination of value of 
community property as affected by the income tax liability, and the 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce contained the same language 
as the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the time for appeal began to 
run on the date of the original Judgment or January 25, 2010 and 
thus Susan's appeal is untimely. R., p. 1240. 
E. 
SUSAN'S MOTION TO PETITION THE COURT TO 
ADDRESS THE ADJUSTMENTS MADE EIGHTY-EIGHT 
DAYS AFTER THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE, WAS NOT A 
MOTION AUTHORIZED UNDER ANY STATUTE, RULE, OR 
CASE LAW AND WAS NOT TIMELY. 
On April 23, 2010, 88 days after the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce was entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Petition the Court 
to Address Adjustments. A Motion to Petition the Court to Address 
Adjustments is not one of the recognized motions that would extend 
the time for filing appeal which lapsed on March 8, 2010. 
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With reference to the assertion that Plaintiff's Motion to 
Petition the Court to Address Adjustments was filed pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b), that Rule was not cited as authority for the 
Motion. So too, the Statement of Issues filed in the Appeal to the 
District Court on June 24, 2010, did not identify the denial of a 
1. R. C. P 60 (b) motion. R., p. 1018 1019. Finally the Notice of 
Appeal to the District Court made no mention of I.R.C.P. 60(b). R., 
p. 1007. 
Since Plaintiff is barred from appealing the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce because her appeal was not filed in time, she can 
not indirectly appeal the decision to reconsider the tax 
consequences, vis-a-vis, the denial of her Motion filed April 23, 
2010. The following issues on Appeal to the District Court were 
time barred, Issue A in Appellant's Statement of Issues, alleging 
that the tax was speculative, Issue B-the failure of the Court to 
adjust according to actual tax consequences. R., p. 1019. Susan's 
Motion filed April 23, 2010 was merely an attempt to re litigate 
the previous ruling which remained the same regarding the tax 
consequence, and the time for appeal had already lapsed on March 8, 
2010 and as such was res judicata. 
Susan's claim, that prior to the Order Re: Post Trial Motions 
there was nothing for her to appeal, is incorrect. I f she had 
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contested any of the Magistrate Judge's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as she does now for the very same reason that 
failed her at trial, she should have timely filed a Motion 
contesting those findings and conclusions or a Notice of Appeal, 
and simply not have objected to the Form the Judgment and Decree 
which mentioned none of the issues which were the subject of the 
Appeal to the District Court or to the Supreme Court. Susan 
accepted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the 
tax consequence until she failed to consummate her first right to 
purchase the dairy. R., p. 588. Although she objected to the form 
of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, only clerical objections 
were made. The objection did not address any issues on Appeal. The 
issues raised in this Appeal were litigated at trial and became 
final when the appeal time lapsed on March 8, 2010. 
F. 
SUSAN'S APPEAL FROM THE ORDER RE: POST TRIAL 
MOTIONS ALSO FAILS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
The District Court determined pre iminarily that it had 
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the Order Re: Post Trial 
Motions entered May 18, 2010. Rule 11(a) (7), I.A.R. The Order of 
May 18, 2010 was an Order made after final Judgment. Yet, the 
District Court properly determined that the Magistrate lacked 
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jurisdiction to enter an Order Re: Post Trial Motions regarding the 
Vierstra Dairy tax liability, namely paragraph 4. 
Generally the property division portions of a Decree of 
Di vorce are final, .res judi ca ta, and no j ur i sdiction exis ts to 
modify property divisions of a divorce decree. McB.ride v. McB.ride, 
112 Idaho 959, 739 P.2d 258 (1987). Susan failed to timely invoke 
within fourteen (14) days after entry of the Judgment on January 
27, 2010, a Motion to Amend the Findings of the Court (Rule 52 (b) , 
I.R.C.P.), to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Rule 59(e), I.R.C.P.), 
seek a new trial (Rule 59 (b) , I.R.C.P.) , or ask for 
reconsideration, Rule 11(a) (2) (b), I.R.C.P.). Nor did she timely 
appeal by March 8, 2010. Ha.rper v. Harpe.r, 122 Idaho 536, 536-537, 
835 P.2d 1346, 1347 48 (Ct. App. 1992); Rule 14 (a), I.A.R.; and 
Rule 83(e), I.R.C.P. Nor did Susan file a Rule 60 (b) I.R.C.P. 
Motion, as she had done earlier in the case, but which she 
withdrew. R., 488 and R. 592. The Distr ct Court properly followed 
Harper and applied the law correctly. Idaho t. Of Health and 
Welfa.re v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009). 
An Amended Judgment contained the same paragraph as follows: 
"The Court finds the tax consequence to be 
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 as is shown 
on Exhibit 801 (A). The Court finds that it is 
more likely han not that Vierstra Dairy wi 1 
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incur the tax consequence ... I f no tax 
consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence 
is difference from that shown in Exhibit 
801(A), the parties shall adjust the 
valuations and equalizations accordingly. If 
necessary, the parties can petition the court 
to address the adjustments." 
The last sentence did state, that if necessary the parties can 
petition the court to address the adjustments. To the extent the 
language contemplated a procedure for post judgment modification of 
the property division, it must be one that complies with a statute 
or rule. R., p. 1242. The Magistrate did not refer to a specific 
rule, statute or case law that would avoid the finality and res 
judicata effect of a final Judgment regarding the division of 
property and debt. R. 1242. 
Susan's Motion to petition the court to address adjustments 
filed on April 23, 2010, sought to adjust the income tax liability 
based on the 2009 tax year filing. Her Motion and supporting 
Affidavit did not explicitly identify a statute, rule, or case law 
that gave the Magistrate continuing jurisdiction to alter the final 
Judgment. R. 1242. 
To save her from such omission in this appeal, Susan contends 
her Motion was really a RuJe 60 (b) / I. R. C. P. Motion. RuJe 60 (b) 
provides several grounds for relief from a Judgment, such as 
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60 (b) (1), (2), (5) and (6). Yet the party seeking relief pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) must specify the particular grounds for relief from 
the Judgment. R. 1242; Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 
P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003). A Rule 60(b) Motion may only be granted 
where the moving party has shown "unique and compelling 
circumstances". Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 
234 P.2d 699, 704 (2010) The principle of finality supports such 
a standard. See McBride, supra, at p. 963. 
The determination of whether a Motion is a Rule 60(b) Motion 
depends on its substance. See Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 116, 
878 P.2d 813,814, n.1 (Ct. App. 1994). R.1239. Susan's Affidavit 
filed in support of her Motion to Petition the Court to address the 
adjustments read as follows: 
"The 2009 income taxes have been completed as 
married filing separate which resulted in a 
total payment of $85,376 ($42,790 and $42,586) 
after the State refund of $340 ($170 for each) 
for a net tax payment of $85,036. This 
payment included capital gains taxes due on 
sale of animals. Per the Memorandum and 
Decision, this full amount is to be paid by 
the dairy accounts/Mike. The d fference 
between the tax and the reduction in value for 
the tax liability is $920,964. Accord ng to 
our calculation, one half of this amount or 
$460,482 is due to complete the equa ization 
and tax adjustment." 
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Initially it is noted that the Motion was not a Rule 60 (b) 
Motion since it did not request relief from the Judgment which is 
the purpose of a Rule 60(b) Motion as is captured in the heading 
and first sentence of the Rule. R. 1243. Rather, Susan sought to 
enforce the Decree and the language, "i f the tax consequence is 
different from that shown on Exhibit 801 (A), the parties shall 
adjust the valuation and equalization accordingly. R. 602 and 962. 
Moreover, Susan did not label or perceive the Motion to 
Petition the Court to Address Adjustments to be a Rule 60(b) Motion 
or treat it as such. R. 1243. Susan obj ected to an evidentiary 
hearing on her Motion, R. 1035, although she had the burden of 
showing unique and compelling circumstances to persuade Mag strate 
Smyser to grant a Rule 60(b) Motion. Also see Appellant's Brief at 
p. 6. Susan sought to bar testimony from C.P.A. Buckner Harris 
upon whom the court relied, that explained why the tax amount 
reducing the value of the dairy, now solely payable by Mike, was 
still correct. R. 948.13 Tr., Vol. II of II, May 12,2010 hearing, 
101-104. r., Vol. 1, May 12, 2010, p. 67-68. 
The District Court correctly found, despite Susan' urging, 
that the substance of the Motion to Petition the Cour to Address 
~3 The $1,006,000 tax 1 ability became final in that Susan failed to timely 
appeal. The T ial Court never changed that finding. 
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Adjustments was not a Rule 60 (b) Motion that provided the 
Magistrate jurisdiction to modify the Judgment. Therefore, as the 
District Court held, the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to enter 
portions of the Order Re: Post Trial Motions regarding the Vierstra 
tax liability. The Court held that the Magistrate was without 
jurisdiction to conduct the post trial hearing and enter paragraph 
4 of the Order Re: Post Trial Motions. R. 1253. The ruling was 
correct, in that the decision on the tax issue was final. It is 
established law in Idaho that the division of property and debt in 
a divorce decree if not appealed by the parties is final, res 
judicata, and no jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions 
of the Decree. McBride v. McBride, supra. 
Having the agreed upon valuation date for assets and debts of 
October 13, 2009, R. 546, 574, the Court determined the value of 
the community assets and debts and disposition thereof in the 
Memorandum Decision from which there was no timely appeal. R. 545-
547. The adjudjcation and assignment of the tax obligation to the 
party who exercised the option to buy the dairy was res judicata. 
Absent an agreed upon date, the date of valuation is the date of 
entry of the decree. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 21 
P.3d 918 (2001); McAffee v. McAffee, 132 Idaho 281, 971 P.2d 734 
(Ct. App. 1999); and Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 815 
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P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1991). There is no provision or rule that 
allows the court to avoid the finality of a Judgment by leaving the 
door open to re-litigate the same issue again in futuro. Mike, by 
the Decree, must pay all the tax consequence of $1,006,000 since he 
received the Dairy, its debt, and the tax. Judge Smyser did not 
change his ruling on May 18, 2010 concerning the tax issue. Susan 
had litigated at great length during the trial her view contesting 
the amount and that the $1,006,000 amount was speculative. The 
testimony of both accountants in the case consumed over 349 pages 
of typed transcript testimony. Once the Divorce Decree became 
final, it was res judicata with respect to all issues which were 
litigated. Harper v. Harper, supra. 
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res 
j udica ta) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) Under the 
principal of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on 
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar 
to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same 
claim. Lohma n v . 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003).1 4 The 
.• The three fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: first it preserves 
the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect tha 
would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsis ent results; second, 
it serves the public interest of the courts against the burdens of repetitious 
litigat on; and third, it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment 
of repetitive cLaims. 
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doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent re-litigation 
of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation 
of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were 
actually made, or which might have been made. Lohman, supra at p. 
320. The District Court's rationale is sound, that Susan could not 
return with a tardy Motion on April 23, 2010 to re-litigate a tax 
amount that was decreed since it would destroy the finality of the 
Judgment. McBride, supra at p. 963. 
The Stipulation by the parties fixing the valuation date as of 
October 13, 2009 was binding, Ratliff v. Ratliff, 129 Idaho 422, 
925 P.2d 1121 (1996), and it is on that date based on the best 
evidence available that the tax amount was determined. If Susan 
ended up with the dairy she had to pay that amount, as Mike would 
if he could consummate his option in the event Susan failed to do 
so. 
Looking for a way to characterize her Petition to the Court to 
Address Adjustments, since the Rule 60 (b) attempt will not work, 
Susan's brief to the Supreme Court characterizes the Motion as a 
Motion to enforce the Judgment. The District Court focused on the 
tax language in the Decree that was not mandatory and read, "if 
necessary the parties can petition the court to address the 
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adjustments". Nevertheless, the Decree was still final in fixing 
the tax amount. The Magistrate realized that property and debts at 
divorce, once valued, are to be divided to give each spouse sole 
and immediate control of his or her share of the estate. Carr v. 
Carr r 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1985). R., p. 545 and 
p. 1142; Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 53, 896 P.2d 956, 
961 (1995). The Magistrate realized that is should not force the 
sale of the dairy that Susan wanted if she did not get her way, as 
it would create waste, with each party receiving less. Carr v. 
Carr, supra. R. p. 545 and p. 1003. 
Susan turns to Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 
(2010) urging that there should be a remedy in this case to 
interpret the Decree her way. First, she remarks that the court in 
McBride, supra, appeared to indicate that a party to a property 
settlement agreement that is not merged in the Decree may seek 
court enforcement where the other party has failed to carry out the 
terms of the agreement. McBride should not be read that way because 
the court cannot enforce a non-merged Property Settlement Agreement 
It is this ianguage, contrary to Susan's urging, that did not make for an 
automatic adjustment as the parties may not agree to adjust the equal zation amount. 
That further, the tax calculation is complicated and contentious. The ad ustment is 
not automatic or set in stone as Susan urges on page 21 0 he brief. 
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since it is a contract not incorporated in the Decree. Keeler v. 
Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 958 P.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1998); see Foster v. 
Schorr, 139 Idaho 563, 82 P.3d 845 (2003) and Borley v. Smith, 
supra. 16 A party claiming breach must sue for breach or specific 
performance in the proper court and the power of contempt is non-
existent since a non-merged contract is not a court order. 
In order to harmonize the language in Borley found at p. 178 
with prior case law that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to enforce 
the terms of an agreement that was not merged in the Decree, such 
could be done in a separate contract action for specific 
performance or breach. While normally, depending upon the 
jurisdictional amount, that may occur in the District Court, the 
Supreme Court treated the action before the divorce court as having 
equivalent jurisdiction to do so. 
Contrary to Susan's claim the that adjustment she sought was 
mandatory, Mike is still obligated for the tax and what tax 
planning he will take, as has been taken each year in the past, to 
defer the tax does not change the fact that it reduces the value of 
16 Perhaps over-broadly, the Supreme Court in Barley stated that the Magistrate 
may have the right to enforce the terms of a non-merged agreement, but that may be 
contrary to the rule that such an aggrieved party mus sue in a rate action for 
breach of the non-merged agreement or [or specif performance of a non-merged 
property settlement agreement. 
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the dairy by the actual amount of the $1,006,000 tax on October 13, 
2009, which tax the community has previously rolled year and after 
year into the next year. Tr., Vol. I of II, May 12, 2010, p. 70. 
In short, the tax amount does not go away. 
Borley v. Smith r supra, does not create for Susan the right to 
remake her Motion to Petition the Court to Address Adjustments into 
a Motion to enforce the decree, as it would require, if she did not 
revisi t the Decree under Rule 60 I. R. C. P. , a new action for 
Contempt or otherwise. 
Susan argues that Mike should have brought a Motion to Modify 
the Judgment and Decree, but since Mike did not take exception to 
the Judgment and Decree, and more specifically the tax liability 
finding of $1,006,000, no Motion was required. The testimony of 
both accountants on May 12, 2010, was caused by Susan's Affidavit 
filed April 23, 2010, and her Memorandum of April 26, 2010, 
attacking the tax liability finding and her obstruction of the 
Citizens loan closing. R. p. 911-918, 949, 880. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing Arguments and the standard of review, 
the District Court Decision should be affirmed and Respondent 
should be awarded his costs and attorneys fees incurred in this 
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Appeal. Susan failed to timely file her appeal and the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the same. 
3 f .R \ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day Ofd~l.J~ , 2012. 
BEVIS, THIRY & SCHINDELE, P.A. 
~ ~':;;::;am---............ 
:S A. BEVIS, --
Attorney for Respondent 
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